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exander Nevskii in Paris. In 1888, at the 
age of eleven, he enrolled in the presti-
gious Page Corps in St. Petersburg, also 
attended by Serbian Princes Djordje and 
Alexander Karadjordjević. He graduated 
in 1897 as top cadet in his class with 
the rank of sergeant. On the occasion 
of the coronation of Emperor Nicholas 
II in 1896, Strandman was a designated 
bearer of the imperial insignia. In 1906, 
after four years of service at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, he was appointed sec-
retary of the Russian diplomatic mission 
in Darmstadt, the hometown of Tsarina 
Aleksandra, and at her suggestion. Two 
years later, he was transferred to the same 
post in the Russian Legation in Sofia and 
in 1910 to the Embassy in Constantino-
ple as second secretary. During the latter 
posting he was sent to assist the Russian 
minister in Cetinje during the celebration 
of the fiftieth anniversary of Prince Niko-
la Petrović’s reign and his coronation as 
King of Montenegro, which Strandman 
described in his memoirs. 
Promoted to first secretary of the Le-
gation in Belgrade in September 1911, 
he arrived in Serbia and remained there 
for nearly three decades (with the excep-
tion of the four-year period between 1915 
and 1919). In Belgrade, he witnessed the 
tortuous negotiations between Serbia and 
Bulgaria about a Balkan alliance, prepara-
tions for, the outbreak and consequences 
of the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913, and 
the prominent role played, throughout 
these events, all of which are detailed in 
the memoirs, by the Russian minister 
Nikolai Genrikhovich Hartwig. In par-
ticular, Strandman revealed the extent to 
which his superior was involved in the 
The memoirs of the Russian diplomat Ba-
sil Nikolaievich Strandman, who served 
as a representative of the imperial govern-
ment of Nicholas II Romanov in the early 
twentieth century, were published for the 
first time in Serbian in 2009. Basil Strand-
man served in almost all Balkan capitals: 
in Sofia and Constantinople (1908–1909), 
Cetinje (1910–1911), Belgrade and Niš 
(1911–1915 and 1919–1924). As a partici-
pant in and witness to the dramatic events 
that shook the Balkans – the Young Turk 
revolution in Constantinople, Bulgaria’s 
declaration of independence, the Austro-
Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1908), the Pig War between 
Serbia and Austria-Hungary (1906–1909), 
the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), and the 
outbreak of the First World War (1914) 
– the conscientious diplomat Strandman 
maintained official correspondence with 
his government in St. Petersburg, the gov-
ernments of the countries to which he was 
accredited as well as with other foreign 
diplomats. He also kept a diary, noting 
down his personal impressions about per-
sons and events and, in doing so, produced 
valuable material which later served as a 
basis for this book.
The Balkan Reminiscences are now  ac-
cessible to the readers owing to the effort 
of Jovan Kačaki, who spent years search-
ing for the manuscript, and the Belgrade-
based Žagor publishing house. The Ser-
bian edition of these memoirs has been 
the first to see the light of day, thus paying 
homage to a man and diplomat who de-
voted his entire life to the good of Russia 
and Serbia, the countries he equally con-
sidered his own.
Emperor Alexander II, through his 
personal envoy, stood as godfather at 
Strandman’s baptism in the church of Al- * Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
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conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian agree-
ment aimed against the Ottoman Em-
pire, which largely coincided with his own 
view of the political situation: in facilitat-
ing this convention Hartwig showed little 
regard for the Russian minister of foreign 
affairs, Sergei Sazonov, whom he disliked 
as much as he disliked his colleague in 
Sofia, Anatolii Nekliudov. 
After the outbreak of the Great War 
Strandman moved from Belgrade to Niš 
together with the Serbian government 
and spent there the first year of the war. In 
December 1914, Count Grigorii Niko-
laevich Trubetskoi was appointed Russian 
minister to Serbia. He was considered to 
be a pro-Bulgarian diplomat. However, 
in his writings, Strandman tried to de-
fend him against these “malicious assess-
ments”. Trubetskoi promoted Strandman 
to the post of first secretary of the Russian 
Embassy to Italy. It was in Rome that he 
received the news of the Bolshevik revo-
lution in Russia and the brutal execution 
of the imperial family. This tragic event 
plunged him into depression from which 
he never fully recovered. In 1918, the last 
year of the war, he was a volunteer in the 
“heroic” Serbian army. Regent Alexander 
greeted him cordially and bestowed the 
rank of cavalry captain 1st class on him. 
He remained on the Salonika Front un-
til November 1918, when Sazonov sum-
moned him to the Russian Embassy in 
Paris during the Peace Conference. After 
the war, he remained in Belgrade as “ex-
traordinary and plenipotentiary minister” 
of the White Russian government headed 
by Admiral Kolchak until 1924. After the 
Second World War and the communist 
revolution in Yugoslavia, he became an 
exile again, spending the last days of his 
life in Washington, USA. 
It was in Washington, in the 1950s, 
that he wrote his Balkan Reminiscences 
without any intention of ever having them 
published, which adds to the credibility 
of his account. It should be noted that 
he chose to write his name in its French 
form, as Basil de Strandman, probably for 
political reasons: for the most part of his 
life he was officially and privately engaged 
in opposing aggressive Germandom and 
for that reason must have found the use of 
the “von Strandman” form out of place. 
Strandman’s memoirs offer a wealth 
of information about the nature of di-
plomacy, behind-the-scenes actions of 
diplomats, their mutual relations, largely 
dependent on the relations between their 
respective countries, the attitude of the 
Russian diplomats serving in Belgrade 
towards the imperial government in St. 
Petersburg and the Russian diplomatic 
representatives in other countries. His 
records provide a lucid account of the 
complexity of diplomacy, of the occasion-
al brutality, ruthlessness, discomfort and 
contradictions in which a diplomat’s per-
sonal traits can sometimes interfere with 
official policy despite the instructions 
received. Nothing essential has changed 
in diplomacy over the centuries: relations 
have always been determined by the rela-
tive strength and power of different states. 
In particular the great powers have never 
been too scrupulous in pursuing their 
goals.
Strandman’s memoirs fill a major la-
cuna: they shed light not only on Rus-
sia’s policy towards the Balkans, but also 
on his personal views on the troubling 
“Balkan questions”.   These views evolved 
from the restrained official attitude at 
the beginning of his service in Belgrade 
to an overt pro-Serbian stance during 
and after the First World War. In this 
context, Strandman’s views seem to fall 
somewhere between two polarised opin-
ions which marked Russian diplomacy 
in the Balkans and were propounded by 
Strandman’s superiors in Serbia. Hartwig, 
Russian minister in Belgrade, was an 
Austrophobe, pan-Slav and decidedly 
pro-Serbian, and he was quite inclined 
to interpret the official policy of his For-
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eign Ministry according to his own lights, 
which made him immensely popular in 
Serbian governmental and political circles 
and among the general public. In conver-
sations with Strandman, officials of the 
Serbian Foreign Ministry used to refer to 
prime minister Nikola Pašić’s almost daily 
consultations with Hartwig in a charac-
teristic manner: “Our beard is consulting 
with your beard” (both men grew impres-
sive beards). Hartwig’s many opponents 
in St. Petersburg thought of him as be-
ing a representative of Serbia at the Rus-
sian court rather than Russian minister in 
Belgrade. Strandman recalls that the in-
fluential Russian politician N. Girs wrote 
that Hartwig should follow the interests 
of Russia and not Serbia – Hartwig’s 
Austrophobia was outmatched only by 
his Anglophobia. Girs also added that 
Hartwig, on account of his pronounced 
pro-Serbian stance, should be moved to 
Bucharest “where he would cause less 
damage”.
After the Austro-Hungarian ulti-
matum to Serbia in July 1914, Hartwig 
died of a heart attack, and was buried in 
Belgrade. His funeral was attended by all 
prominent Serbian political and public 
figures, even by a delegation of farmers 
who came from various Serbian regions 
to pay their respects to the diplomat 
whose name they affectionately Serbian-
ized: Nikola Hartvić. In the fateful days 
following the Sarajevo assassination and 
Vienna’s firm reaction, Strandman be-
came, in his capacity as chargé d’affaires, 
a temporary head of the Russian diplo-
matic mission in Belgrade. During this 
nerve-wrecking political and military 
uncertainty, the eyes of Serbian politi-
cians and the court were turned to him 
as a representative of mighty Russia, Ser-
bia’s traditional protector and ally. He 
was not prepared for such a tremendous 
burden of responsibility: his late superior 
failed to acquaint him more closely with 
Serbian politicians and intellectuals, pre-
sumably partly because he disapproved of 
Strandman’s initially firm adherence to 
the official policy of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry which required utmost caution, 
suppression of “Serbian excessive foreign 
policy ambitions” and avoidance of pro-
voking Austria-Hungary in any way. 
More important for the history of 
Serbia are Strandman’s accounts of his 
conversations with Regent Alexander, in 
particular the one in the course of which 
the former persuaded the latter that he 
rather than his father, King Peter I (as 
suggested by the Cabinet), should send 
a telegram to Tsar Nicholas II pleading 
for urgent help and support to Serbia at 
the critical moment following Austria-
Hungary’s ultimatum. The description of 
Pašić’s and Strandman’s reaction to the 
long-awaited reply of Nicholas II that 
confirmed Russia’s decision to stand by 
Serbia in any eventuality is rather strik-
ing: “On that day, late in the evening on 
28 July, I was handed a coded telegram 
from Sazonov which took longer than a 
day to arrive. It contained the following 
reply of Tsar Nicholas II to Prince Re-
gent Alexander’s telegram: ‘Your Royal 
Majesty, having addressed me at the ex-
tremely difficult moment, you have not 
been mistaken about the feelings which 
I nourish for You and my abiding affec-
tion for the Serbian people. The current 
situation commands my most serious 
attention and my government spares no 
effort to overcome the current difficul-
ties. I have no doubt that Your Majesty 
and the Royal Government will be im-
bued with desire to make that task easier 
and will not fail to do anything possible 
that will bring about the solution which 
will prevent the horrors of a new war 
while preserving the dignity of Serbia. 
As long as there is the slightest hope to 
avoid bloodshed, all our efforts must be 
directed towards that goal. If, however, 
despite our most sincere wishes we fail in 
our endeavour, Your Majesty may rest as-
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sured that Russia will not be indifferent 
to Serbia’s fate in any eventuality.’ I was 
ordered to forward the telegram to the 
addressee. Given the late hour at which 
the deciphering had been completed, I 
decided to wait until morning, hoping 
that Prince Regent would arrive in Niš 
during the night. But my expectations 
did not materialise so I decided – in or-
der to avoid further delay – to hand in 
the telegram to Pašić. Despite the early 
hour, I found Pašić in his office. Having 
quickly read the telegram, he – it seemed 
to me – turned to stone at first, and then 
got extremely excited. He crossed himself 
and said: ‘Lord, Great Merciful Russian 
Tsar.’ He got out of his chair, came up 
to me and we kissed each other. His eyes 
were full of tears. Such manifestation of 
the emotional distress of a man whose 
entire life had been a difficult school of 
self-control and restraint and who had 
faced death several times in the past 
could illustrate the extent to which he 
had been emotionally strained over the 
last few days – since the survival of his 
beloved and dear Serbia was at stake. The 
telegram of Lord Emperor provided not 
just hope, but also a confirmation of the 
rectitude of firm reliance on the support 
of Russia. Although the Prince Regent’s 
arrival was not expected before the eve-
ning, the content of the Tsar’s reply was 
immediately relayed to Kragujevac on the 
telephone.”        
Interestingly, Strandman devoted 
several chapters to the aggressive me-
dia campaigns of some countries, nota-
bly Austria-Hungary, during the Balkan 
Wars. The Austro-Hungarian press wrote 
at length and with abhorrence about the 
barbaric war of the Ottoman succes-
sion waged between half-civilized Bal-
kan states and voiced constant charges 
of the alleged crimes committed against 
“innocent Muslim civilians” in “Euro-
pean Turkey”. These charges were levelled 
against the Serbian army, although it duly 
respected all conventions of international 
law in times of war, as confirmed by the 
newspapers correspondents from the 
theatre of operations. The Serbian army 
was highly disciplined, unlike the Bulgar-
ian army. Strandman points out that the 
Bulgarian army committed many massa-
cres on the frontline, but they were not 
reported by the international press. It was 
Austria-Hungary, anxious about Serbian 
victories that hampered her Balkan and 
Middle Eastern policy, that stood be-
hind such an aggressive media campaign 
against the “evil Serbs”. 
According to Strandman, Austria-
Hungary was keeping a close watch on 
every step of the Belgrade government in 
order to seize on any opportunity which 
could be used against Serbia and her po-
litical goals. Since such opportunities were 
not forthcoming, the Dual Monarchy did 
not shrink from staging them, seeking 
for international legitimacy to send her 
army to the Serbian border. The case of 
the Austro-Hungarian consul in Prizren, 
Karel Prohaska, clearly demonstrated the 
lengths to which Vienna was prepared 
to go in order to falsely accuse Serbia. 
In November 1912, there were rumours 
that the Serbs mistreated, even killed, the 
Austro-Hungarian diplomat. The “unac-
ceptable” behaviour of the Serbian army 
towards the representative of the “friend-
ly” Austro-Hungarian Empire was widely 
reported about across Europe.
 What really happened in Prizren? 
The Serbian military prevented Prohaska 
from maintaining encrypted commu-
nication with Vienna and restricted his 
activities to purely consular affairs. This 
measure was provoked by the consul’s 
overt instigation of local Albanians to 
rise against Serbia. The incident strained 
relations between Serbia and Austria-
Hungary so much that it brought them 
to the brink of war. In Strandman’s opin-
ion, Austro-Hungary came very close to 
delivering an ultimatum to the Serbian 
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government on that occasion and plung-
ing Europe into a full-scale war. It took 
Prohaska’s return to Vienna and his con-
fession that he had not been deprived of 
anything in Prizren, less alone tortured, 
to relieve the tension.   
Strandman’s impressions of the dip-
lomatic representatives of other Euro-
pean countries, gained on his arrival in 
Belgrade, are rather interesting. He re-
vealed that in 1911 the Russian minister 
Hartwig had nurtured friendly relations 
with his French counterpart Descos alone. 
The two diplomats had already met in 
Tehran, and their cordial relations in Bel-
grade were interpreted to have stemmed 
from the mutual exchange of information 
concerning the latest developments in the 
Balkans. However, Hartwig was cautious 
in his dealings with Descos and kept re-
ally confidential matters to himself; pur-
portedly, he began to doubt the French-
man’s good judgement since the latter did 
not consider the outbreak of a war in the 
Balkans possible.
As for the British minister to Serbia, 
Sir Arthur Paget, Strandman did not find 
him politically far-sighted either. The 
Briton was convinced that Serbia would 
eventually be absorbed by the Habsburg 
Monarchy. On one occasion, Paget told 
Strandman that the British government 
had no plans to build its Legation in Bel-
grade “because there was no reason to do 
so”. 
As for the German minister to Ser-
bia, Baron Griesinger, Strandman wrote 
that he had been a “nothing in every re-
spect”. Due to her commercial interests, 
Germany had her consulate in Belgrade 
the head of which, consul Schlieben, was 
“much smarter and more sociable than his 
Minister and, along with his wife, a quite 
frequent guest at Hartwig’s”.
Austria-Hungary was represented by 
Baron Ugron. His predecessor, Count 
Forgách, was remembered by the Serbs 
for his active role in the farcical 1909 
“High Treason Trial” of leading members 
of the Serbian community in Croatia in 
Zagreb and the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1908. For those reasons, 
Strandman noted, Baron Ugron had to 
count with an open national boycott of 
trade with Austria-Hungary. He left the 
impression of a kind person prepared to 
discuss matters, but he was not like that 
on further acquaintance. He used to walk 
down the middle of the street rather than 
the sidewalk. It was rumoured in Belgrade 
that Ugron did so out of fear of a possible 
attack and to avoid having something 
dropped on his head from the upper sto-
ries of buildings.
Basil Strandman’s memoirs bear wit-
ness to the abiding affection with which 
he came to view Serbia and the Serbian 
people. He manifested his affection and 
concern for Serbs during the first year of 
the war in Niš, when he spared no effort 
to impress on the Russian government 
and other Allies the necessity to alleviate 
the difficult position of occupied Serbia 
and her people. 
Strandman’s Balkan Reminiscences 
have importance as a source for the po-
litical and social history of the Balkans, 
diplomatic history, anthropology, political 
science, even for literary consideration.
